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This chapter deals with some questions which may be of general interest in the context of 
subcontinental political economy. It does this by posing some specific questions about the 
role of religion in Bangladesh. To answer these questions, we examine the role of what we 
call clientelist surplus appropriation. The role of religion and secularism in Bangladesh raises 
some puzzling questions. Why did a country which ostensibly fought so hard to achieve a 
secular constitution achieve so little in the way of substantive changes in the role of religion in 
society and politics in the next twenty five years? The ostensibly secular constitution of 1972 
was diluted by successive military and civilian governments without much public protest after 
Mujib’s government was toppled by a military coup in 1975. His party, the Awami League 
led eventually by his daughter, did come back to power 21 years later in 1996. Although still 
ostensibly committed to secularism, Mujib’s daughter was even more careful than her father 
to emphasize her personal religiosity. She undertook the pilgrimage to Mecca, and donned a 
version of the hijab. This helped her to acquire a public image as a more conservative 
Muslim than her arch-rival Khaleda Zia of the centre-right BNP who appeared in dress and 
demeanour to be more liberal and modern. While still officially committed to secularism 
defined as the rejection of the use of religion in politics, the new Awami League is clearly 
making a point of using religious symbolism in defining itself.  
 
The ups and downs in the use of religion, religious identities and religious symbolism in the 
politics of Bangladesh over the last twenty-five years raises interesting questions for political 
economists. How do we explain the mass support for the much more assertive secularism of 
the Awami League in the late sixties followed by the subsequent fragmentation of this 
“secular coalition” in the eighties? Why did support for an ostensibly secular party, 
admittedly a much more watered down secular party, re-emerge in the mid-nineties? Are 
these changes essentially non-economic in their motivation? Or are these changes in fact 
driven at least to some extent by economic interests and conflicts? If so what is the nature of 
these economic conflicts? 
 
While not denying the importance of non-economic forces and motivations, including the 
influence of developments in the wider world, we argue that the domestic political economy 
provides at least an important part of the answer. On the other hand we reject the implicit 
class and social analysis which claims that secular political parties and movements are 
necessarily “progressive” while parties using religious symbols are “reactionary”. Instead we 
argue that the dominant patterns of both secular and religious mobilizations in Bangladesh 
and in the Indian subcontinent as a whole often have very damaging developmental effects 
and secular parties are not necessarily more “progressive”. On the other hand this does not 
suggest that we should be politically neutral in judging communal as against secular parties.  
 
A brief discussion of the nature of this political economy constitutes the theoretical 
component of this chapter. We argue that in the typical developing country, religious and 
secular demands do not emanate from distinct classes. Instead, they emerge in the context of 
specific types of patron-client politics which in the context of the Indian subcontinent we 
describe as clientelist politics. Here pyramidally organized multi-class political organizations 
led by “middle class” organizers compete for power and access to state resources. 
Competing factions use religious, secular, ideological and even personality based identities to 
mobilise support and distinguish themselves from their competitors. We describe the surplus 
appropriated by competing factions through such mobilizations as “clientelist surplus 
appropriation”. We argue that this is a major component of the political economy driving 
political mobilizations in Bangladesh and indeed in other parts of the Indian subcontinent.  
 
The dominance of clientelist as opposed to class mobilizations in the Indian subcontinent 
explains why the same individual or party can frequently change ideological and political 
affiliations without too much personal or political difficulty. The fact that ideological 
associations are fluid and have little effect on the substantial behaviour of their adherents is a 
well known phenomenon of Bangladeshi and indeed of subcontinental politics. The political 
economy behind this fluidity is less widely recognized and is the central theme of this 
chapter. 
 
We should stress that to say that religious or secular ideologies have been primarily used in 
the course of factional competition is not to deny that the banners under which people are 
mobilized do not matter. Movements have a life of their own once they start. They build on 
and often accentuate pre-existing affiliations, hatreds and identities. Nevertheless, it is 
important to attempt to locate clientelist politics within the broader class and social evolution 
of the subcontinental economy. We can do this by drawing a useful contrast between the 
social mobilizations behind religious and secular philosophies in the South Asian context and 
the conflicting classes arrayed behind the Church and its opponents during the Reformation 
conflicts in Western Europe. This is particularly important because the identification of 
secular politics as “progressive” and of religious politics as “reactionary” derives from an 
analytical reading of European history. 
 
Our basic argument is that it is a mistake to see the conflict between secular and religious 
ideologies in a country like Bangladesh in terms of a conflict between clearly defined class 
interests. It is certainly not explicable in terms of a conflict between the economic interests of 
a progressive bourgeoisie supporting secularism and a reactionary feudal and pre-capitalist 
classes supporting the sanctions and powers of religion. Indeed we would argue there is no 
simple class dichotomy between the supporters of secularism and those of other ideologies. 
On the other hand, the use of religious and secular ideologies by competing factions does 
map into competing economic interests but they are the economic interests of competing 
factions led by the upwardly mobile middle classes. What is important is that the leadership 
of these competing factions are quite similar in class terms and moreover they mobilize social 
groups below them which in turn are quite similar to each other.  
 
The competition between these multi-class alliances led by competing factions of the middle 
class is often structured around ideological or philosophical debates. Yet we argue that it is a 
mistake to see these rival positions as much more than incidental to the real political 
economy of factional competition. In the clientelist case, the ideologies themselves are not 
fundamentally important to the economic interests of the faction. What is perceived as more 
important by the protagonists is the need to distinguish their faction from others and to 
prevent rival factions from challenging them if they happen to be in power. The economic 
implications of the differences in the ideological positions of competing factions have been 
secondary and indeed have been treated as secondary by the participants themselves. This 
is demonstrated by the readiness with which they have often changed their ideological 
allegiances in response to changing alignments of factional political power. 
 
Not surprisingly these ongoing factional conflicts have failed to transform society in any 
fundamental way because the contending ideologies did not represent substantive material 
interests of competing economic classes. This may seem surprising given that ideological 
positions are tenaciously defended at any one time and the victory or defeat of particular 
political parties does seem to result in changes in economic performance. Nevertheless, 
these differences in performance are more plausibly explained by the fact that new 
individuals and policies are brought in and sometimes new rounds of primitive accumulation 
takes place as well, all of which can have consequences for performance. On the other 
hand, the victory or defeat of particular ideological positions does not usually seem to be 
associated with significant changes in the class nature of the state. There is even stronger 
support for the claim that particular ideologies are not the preserve of particular classes. 
There is much evidence that competing groups and individuals are able to change their 
ideological affiliations flexibly in response to changed circumstances which we would not 
expect to the same extent if their professed ideologies truly reflected class interests. Victory 
or defeat for particular positions may of course have unintended effects on the cultural and 
political space. Our argument does not deny the significance of these effects even though we 
would argue that lasting changes in culture and politics have to be based on changes in the 
material conditions of society. 
 
Finally, we argue that although clientelist faction fighting did not change the broad class 
character of the state, the overall economic effects of clientelist conflicts have been 
unqualifiedly regressive. It has used up scarce investible resources and has prevented 
accumulation and growth. The conflicts and contests have of course been very useful for 
small groups of individuals who have succeeded in rising up the social scale and their 
success has attracted others into the fray. This is after all the whole point of organizing 
factional conflicts. But for the economy as a whole the results have been little short of 
disastrous over time. The failure to analyse the implications of the political economy of this 
process even when the process itself is widely recognized has hampered serious analysis of 
the implications of these conflicts for growth and accumulation and therefore for social 
progress in the long term. 
 
Section 1 discusses the different ways in which religion can be used politically, contrasting 
the conflicts between secularism and religion in the European Reformation with similar 
conflicts in South Asia. Section 2 looks at the path dependant evolution of secular and 
religious ideologies in Bangladeshi politics in a way which is consistent with the competition 
between clientelist factions. Section 3 discusses in outline the key features of clientelist 
political economy and how it helps to explain the changing fate of secularism in Bangladesh. 
 
1. Religion, Secularism and Class Interests 
Any analysis of the political economy of religion in the Indian subcontinent or elsewhere must 
preface itself with the recognition that the role of religion in society does not simply depend 
on material interests. Nevertheless, the material interests of evolving and conflicting classes 
have been at least one of the major factors influencing the changes in the role of religion in 
the politics of countries. In the advanced capitalist countries of the West, the conflict 
between the Church and secular social forces during the Reformation is rightly recognized as 
one of the defining components of the transition to modernity. The popular association of 
secularism with social progress is quite clearly based on a reading of this European history. 
Yet there were some very specific social factors which ensured that secular demands in 
Europe were associated with the development of science and technology and consequently 
with rising living standards which ensured its support by wide sections of society.  
 
The specific features of the Reformation differed from country to country in Western Europe 
but nevertheless there are some broad features which these countries shared in common. 
Productive capitalist classes were emerging in these countries based on long-distance trade 
and finance and at the same time, states were being constructed which could exercise 
territorial jurisdictions within which capitalism could grow. The declining social forces based 
on landed property, the wealth of the Church and the political ambitions of a Church-based 
empire were part of the social coalition which was opposed to these changes. As a result 
there were relatively sharp economic conflicts between monarchs, the Church and emerging 
capitalists over their material interests which in this context put the Church on one side and a 
collection of progressive economic forces on the other1. 
 
The most obvious economic conflict between monarchs and the Church was over the vast 
amounts of land owned by the Church. These assets not only reduced the access of the 
monarch to revenues but created a powerful competing political force often allied to Rome 
which prevented national consolidation. Secondly, there was a conflict between merchants 
and the Church over the theological acceptability of income from usury in Christianity. Here 
capitalist accumulation which was driving productivity growth faced obstacles from a pre-
capitalist Church-based system of maintaining social order with notions of justice which 
were not appropriate for the new order. Finally there was a conflict between Church and 
state over their respective jurisdictions when it came to appoint officers to lucrative 
administrative and judicial positions. In this case too, territorially defined emerging modern 
states faced competition from a parallel set of jurisdictions organized around the Church. 
Thus the economic interests underlying the ideological conflict between Church and secular 
social forces were based on radically different ways of organizing production. This is what 
we mean by saying that religion and secularism represented conflicting class interests in 
Reformation Europe. This in turn ensured that the victory of one side or the other would 
have economic consequences for the mode of organizing production in Western Europe 
over a period of several centuries.  
 
The emerging economic supremacy of the secular interests which challenged the Church 
during the Reformation resulted in much more rapid economic growth and this ensured that 
political practice eventually became more or less secular across Western Europe. This is 
despite the fact that in many European countries, including England, the formal constitutional 
separation of Church and state has not emerged to this day. The Western European story is 
important because the theoretical association of secular movements with the liberal 
bourgeoisie and therefore with social progress is based on a reading of this history.  
                                                                 
1An excellent analysis of this period is in Tawney, R. H. 1938. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
 
The political economy of religion in contemporary developing countries is clearly somewhat 
different. In the Indian subcontinent neither Hinduism nor Islam had an organized church with 
large land-holdings along the European pattern either in pre-colonial or colonial times or 
indeed subsequently. Nor had there been any ongoing competition between “church” and 
state over their respective jurisdictions in appointing office-holders along the European 
pattern. The weakness of religious control and the possibility of profit-sharing as a way of 
avoiding the ban on usury meant that the restrictions on usury in Islam did not lead to intense 
conflicts between emerging merchants and religious leaders even in the early days of the 
emergence of merchant capital in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In independent 
Pakistan or Bangladesh, the merchant and capitalist classes have certainly not felt threatened 
by the anti-capitalism implicit in the Islamic ban on usury. Similarly, while some aspects of 
Hinduism such as the caste system may in principle appear to be anti-capitalist, emerging 
Hindu traders and capitalists have not felt threatened by these anti-capitalist aspects of 
Hinduism and have certainly not been in the forefront of the secular movements in India. 
These differences in the role of religion in the rise of capitalism clearly have something to do 
with the formal institutional strength of the Christian church in pre-Reformation Europe 
compared to Islam and Hinduism in the contemporary subcontinent. 
 
On the other hand, religion and religious identities have played a prominent role in 
subcontinental politics. But they have done so as part of the armoury used by competing 
factions to distinguish themselves from each other and to mobilize broadly defined “mass” 
social groups sharing pre-existing identities and primordial loyalties. It is useful to contrast 
the relatively sharply defined economic interests of Church, state and merchants in 
Reformation Europe with the way in which factions in the Indian subcontinent have used 
religious and secular ideologies.  
 
On the one hand, dominant factions in India have used religious identities (along with other 
identities) to construct or reinforce national identities when they have been in power or close 
to power. Their aim in doing this has been to reduce centrifugal tendencies within society 
and no less important, to reduce opposition to their own authority and right to rule. On the 
other hand and apparently diametrically opposed to this has been the use of religion (as well 
as of other identities) by excluded factions to form groups which contest existing elites. 
Their aim has usually been to threaten to increase centrifugal tendencies to force dominant 
groups to make concessions in the form of payoffs or to overthrow them entirely.  
 
An example of the use of religious identities by incumbent factions was the attempt by the 
Muslim League in the fifties to create an Islamic identity in Pakistan. A more recent example 
is the attempt to forge national cohesion in India by the incumbent BJP and its allies in the 
late nineties using the symbols of Hindu revivalism. On the other hand, an example of the use 
of religion by excluded factions to organize alternative power bases was the activism of the 
Muslim League in India in the forties or indeed the BJP in India in the eighties. Examples can 
also easily be found of the use of secular ideologies by both dominant and excluded groups 
in exactly the same way. For instance, Nehru’s Congress Party in India in the fifties and 
Mujib’s Awami League in Bangladesh between 1971 and 1975 attempted to create 
legitimacy for the incumbent factions in each country using secular ideologies. In contrast, 
secular Bengali nationalism was used by Mujib’s Awami League in Pakistan during the 
sixties to enable the excluded East Pakistani elites to mobilise a mass following around them 
in their bid to challenge the West Pakistani monopoly over economic power. 
 
Yet although the strategies of dominant and excluded groups appear to be quite contrary, 
the pyramidal organization of multi-class clientelist factions in subcontinental politics means 
that the class differences between incumbent and excluded groups are much more muted 
and complex. In many cases, the incumbent and excluded factions may be quite similar in the 
mix of classes they mobilize. In other cases there may of course be differences in the mix of 
classes mobilized. But in general we do not find clear cut economic interests which are 
promoted or hampered by the substance of religious rules or the relative dominance of the 
“church” which serve to distinguish the class interests of the supporters of religious as 
opposed to secular politics. Indeed this is true for the way in which most ideological 
affiliations are used most of the time in subcontinental politics. 
 
The ideological affiliations of the groups in and out of power rarely directly reflect the 
material interests of competing classes. Secularism for instance is not the ideology of an 
emerging capitalist class which feels its interests are constrained by the fusion of church and 
state or by religious injunctions against certain kinds of market transactions. Nor is socialism 
primarily the expression of working class or peasant demands. Instead both secularism and 
socialism, together with Islam and other ideologies reflect material interests only indirectly. 
They do this by consolidating and identifying shifting groups or factions within the emerging 
middle classes who are competing against each other for access to state power which in turn 
is the most important source of access to a share of the social surplus given the political 
economy of the subcontinental economies. Thus the ideologies competing for political 
domination do not seek to change economic policy in ways which could be read off from the 
substance of the ideologies themselves. Instead ideological labels appear primarily as labels 
distinguishing competing middle-class-led patron-client networks in their on-going and 
periodically intensifying struggle over resources. On the other hand, a by-product of this 
competition has been that social policy was often affected, since competing groups did 
make changes in the legal and constitutional position of religion for instance. 
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, one of the characteristic features of the use of religious and 
other ideologies in Bangladesh and elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent is the fluidity of 
affiliations and stated beliefs. There are several features of these changing ideological 
affiliations of groups which strike any observer. What distinguishes these ideological conflicts 
in the developing country context from those of the European Reformation (with which they 
are often unconsciously compared) is that in developing countries, often the same individuals 
and factions have organized around diametrically opposed ideological values over a period 
of time. We will see examples of this in the next section. In fact such re-alignments should 
not be surprising if we are right in supposing that the purpose of ideologies is to serve as 
mobilizing symbols for multi-class groups which are essentially quite similar to each other. 
Observers have often responded to the apparent spinelessness or lack of conviction of 
subcontinental political leaders or parties by berating the lack of principles on the part of 
leaders. The fact that Bangladeshi political leaders have often been able and willing to 
rapidly change their ideological affiliations in response to political realignments has led to 
their ideological quarrels often being described in terms of the “politics of rhetoric”2. 
However, the systematic nature of such re-alignments suggests that we have to look beyond 
the principles of individual leaders to find systematic and structural explanations for this 
phenomenon. 
 
Factional conflicts and the organizational logic of factions can explain these realignments to a 
great extent. They have resulted in a particular trajectory of religious and secular politics in 
Bangladesh which is not accidental in the sense that the trajectory is explicable. Yet the 
conflicts have not been between clearly defined class interests which can be identified as 
progressive or reactionary in terms of their relationship to growth and development. This is 
not to say that the competing philosophical positions in themselves cannot be characterized 
as progressive or reactionary, only that the economic interests of the groups which support 
these competing positions are in fact surprisingly similar. Clearly, the political economy 
underlying these mobilizations does not share the sharp class divide which characterized the 
conflict between religious and secular ideologies in Western Europe. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that clientelist faction fighting as a whole has had regressive economic 
implications for developing societies. From a materialist perspective, the support for 
                                                                 
2 Siddiqui, R. 1984. Kathamalar Rajneeti 1972-79 (Politics of Rhetoric 1972-79). Dhaka: Nawroze 
Kitabistan. 
 
 
“progressive” ideologies in this context does not necessarily promise social progress. The 
task of constructing progressive political movements in countries such as Bangladesh is 
actually much more difficult than supporting one side or the other in ongoing factional 
conflicts. A precondition for constructing a progressive politics is to identify the material 
interests of the poor and to create political movements which promote the forces of 
production while ensuring that a bigger share of the national pie really goes to the poor. 
 
2. Path Dependence in the Evolution of Mobilizing Ideologies 
One of the factors which determines the range of ideologies and political philosophies which 
are brought into play by competing factions is clearly the pre-existing social and cultural 
history of a nation which determines the latent beliefs, identities, prejudices and conflicts 
which new mobilizations can draw on. If factional conflicts are an important determinant of 
the choice of ideological symbols then whether religious or secular symbols are chosen by 
incumbent or contesting groups will clearly be path dependent in the sense that at any point 
the choice of ideologies by one group will depend on the prior choices of other groups. This 
is because if the adoption of ideologies by factions serves primarily to distinguish the faction 
and mobilise its supporters, we would expect each group to define itself in ways which 
differentiated itself from its main opponents. This in turn will depend on how its opponents 
have defined themselves in the past. 
 
The ideological shifts which are the subject of our analysis include both the shifts in the 
affiliations of dominant political groups as well as of individuals within those groups. The first 
set of shifts is dramatic enough on its own. The ideological affiliations of the ruling group in 
Bangladesh has see-sawed between "secular" identities based on language or class and 
"religious" identities based on Islam. Their opponents who have been excluded from power 
have also selected a changing set of ideologies to describe themselves depending on who 
they were contesting. What is interesting is that the ideological label which the same group 
has used has often changed substantially in content and emphasis over the cycle of 
opposition and power or in response to other groups changing their identities. As a result, 
instead of evolution towards a national identity based on an amalgam of the different cultural 
and religious constituents of the nation, we find a sustained oscillation between variants of 
these positions over the last fifty years or so.  
 
It is important to stress that the instability has been due not only to the number of groups 
competing for access to state power who have adopted or possess different ideological  
identities, but also due to changes in the ideological position adopted by each group over 
time. The same individuals have often moved from positions which were overtly Marxist to 
positions which were overtly religious or from positions of religious nationalism to ones of 
linguistic and secular nationalism and back again. These oscillations are too systematic and 
widespread to be attributed to the weakness of will or intellect of particular individuals. 
Groups and political parties too have changed their explicit ideological affiliations or split to 
form new parties with directly contrary affiliations. Thus the secular Awami League was 
constructed in the fifties out of the communal Muslim League. Later the Bangladesh National 
Party (BNP) with its stress on an Islamic identity for Bangladesh drew heavily on recruits 
from the Awami League, as did the Jatiya Party which was ideologically quite similar to the 
BNP. In time many of them returned to the secular fold, although over time the secular 
commitments of the Awami League itself have dimmed and become less important.  
 
These oscillations at the level of individuals are important for our story. If individuals 
adopted ideological positions because the ideology in itself reflected something which was 
consistent with their economic interests it would be unusual to see rapid and frequent 
changes of position. For instance if the politics of secularism was driven by an emerging 
class of merchants who found usury laws a great hindrance to their material well-being, a 
few representatives of this class interest may occasionally have moral or other qualms which 
may make them change their position but such events would be relatively rare. On the other 
hand, if secular positions were adopted by individuals not because they reflected their 
fundamental material interests but because the faction in power had adopted a contrary 
position, we would expect a much more fluid set of ideological affiliations. Current affiliation 
would depend on the individual's assessment of the payoffs available under alternative 
affiliations. Thus factional competition may explain the volatility of  ideological positions in 
the context of clientelist surplus appropriation. 
 
The evidence from Bangladesh on the trajectory of religious versus secular ideologies does 
tend to support such a path dependence in the evolution of ruling and contesting ideologies. 
For instance, the first major political polarization which involved religion in what is now 
Bangladesh was the one which led to the creation of East Pakistan in 1947. This political 
polarization of communities into Hindu and Muslim was relatively new and emerged over a 
period of a few decades prior to the partition of India in 1947. Before that time, in the 
thirties, politics in Bengal had been organized around essentially secular but mutually 
competitive factions based on patron-client peasant politics. The coalescence of Muslim 
leaders of the Bengali peasants around the Muslim League in the mid-forties was relatively 
sudden. The prior involvement of leaders such as Fazlul Huq or Hussain Shaheed 
Suhrawardy in essentially secular politics suggests that their sudden affiliation with the 
Muslim League could not have been based on deeply-felt religious goals alone or on any 
essential contradiction between the principles of secularism and their personal class interests.  
 
A more plausible explanation is that the numerical majorities of the Muslim peasantry of 
Bengal and the fact that most landlords happened to be upper caste Hindus offered middle 
class Muslim leaders an irresistible opportunity of organizing large movements to propel 
them to power in the context created by the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League. This 
mooted the demand for Muslim states in the Muslim majority areas of India in 1940 and 
created a new range of organizational possibilities3. The exclusivism and short-sightedness of 
the largely Hindu leadership of the Bengal Congress of that time and the fear of the 
incumbent Hindu elites that their political position was about to be fatally challenged resulted 
in the politics of the Bengal Congress becoming even more communal and exclusivist. The 
polarization and communalisation of Bengal politics in the forties thus affected both 
communities and marked a sharp break in the secular class politics which had been 
dominant in rural Bengal from the inception of modern politics in the early twentieth century4.  
 
What is remarkable is the second and no less dramatic shift in the politics of East Pakistan 
soon after its creation. By the mid-fifties the same mainstream East Bengali politicians who 
had been critically instrumental in the creation of Pakistan began to assert a secular Bengali 
nationalist ideology against the new Pakistan state. The Bengal Muslim League split in the 
fifties and a large section which till very recently had been “communal” suddenly discovered 
that they were really “secular”. Under the leadership of the same Suhrawardy and 
subsequently his lieutenant, Mujib, they split from the Muslim League to set up the Awami 
Muslim League as early as 1949. What is interesting is that the word Muslim was not 
dropped from the name of the party till 1955. Once again, what is likely to have propelled 
the split and the gradual shift towards a secular identity for the Awami League is the conflict 
between the new incumbent elites based in West Pakistan and the East Pakistani Bengali 
middle class which once again found itself excluded. The need to define the group identity of 
this excluded middle class faction in opposition to the Islamic state is the most plausible 
explanation of the rapid emergence of “secular politics” in East Pakistan in the fifties rather 
than any fundamental incompatibility between religion and capitalist development. Thus the 
secular Awami League which led the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 was a direct offshoot of 
the communal Muslim League which had created Pakistan in 1947.  
 
The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 led to further rapid changes in the attitude of ruling and 
excluded groups towards religious and secular identities. As soon as Bangladesh was 
                                                                 
3 Kabir, M.G. 1995. Changing Face of Nationalism: The Case of Bangladesh . Dhaka: University Press 
Limited, pp. 30-121 provides an excellent summary of this period. 
4This does not imply that Bengal society was secular in the modern sense of sharing a widespread belief 
that religion should not define social and political status or rights. Nevertheless, parties such as the 
Krishak Praja Party were secular in not limiting their mobilization to particular religious groups.  
created, the Awami League stopped being the instrument of an excluded faction and 
became instead power base of the new incumbent faction. The secular Bengali nationalism 
of the Awami League had proved very successful in mobilizing mass support to aid the 
political goals of the excluded Bengali elites. But once the League came to power, everyone 
who had supported the Bengali nationalist cause could clearly not be accommodated. A 
new state ideology had to be constructed which would legitimize a new ruling elite while 
offering the fewest possible opportunities for new coalitions to find easy symbols to organize 
around in protest. In this environment, it was far too risky for the Awami League to allow its 
opponents to organize discontent on the grounds that the Awami League was out to destroy 
Islam. Mujib’s subsequent actions suggest that he was making precisely these calculations.  
 
On the one hand, the 1972 constitution embodied the goal of secularism in Article 12 which 
aimed to eliminate “communalism” and the abuse of religion for political purposes5. On the 
other hand, to outflank opponents within his own party, Mujib and the ruling group began to 
court the defeated Islamic political forces. As early as 1973, between 30 and 40,000 
alleged collaborators in the war with Pakistan were released without investigation or trial6. In 
1974 Mujib travelled to Pakistan to attend the Islamic Summit held at Lahore and returned 
home proudly proclaiming Bangladesh to be the world’s second largest Islamic nation 
(ahead of Pakistan). In the same year a Madrasah Education Commission was formed to 
advise on how religious education could be improved. In 1975 Mujib set up the Islamic 
Foundation to promote Islamic studies and to manage mosques.7 Even in terms of the 
narrow definition of secularism in the Bangladesh constitution, some of these moves at least 
were suspect. 
 
These developments would have been truly astounding if Islam and secularism represented 
the actual economic interests of competing classes locked in conflict. They are easier to 
comprehend if we recognize that the Awami League and its opponents were in fact 
mobilizing essentially similar multi-class groups. We can then interpret these concessions as 
Mujib’s search for allies to sustain his hold on power. In the context of clientelist 
competition, the class interests of these competing groups would not be very dissimilar. For 
the ruling party, the issue would be to judge the relative cost of buying support from one 
                                                                 
5 Murshid, T.M. 1996. ibid pp. 360-1. 
6 Kabir, B.M. 1988. “Jamayeter Rajneeti: Ekti Jelabhittik Porjalochona” (The Politics of the Jamaat: A 
District-Level Evaluation) in Khan, B.A. ed. Bangladesh: Dhormo o Shomaj (Bangladesh: Religion and 
Society). Chittagong: Centre for Bangladesh Studies. pp. 83-84. 
7 Murshid, T.M. 1996. The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Discourses 1871-1977. Dhaka: 
University Press Limited, pp. 362-3. Kabir, M.G. 1995. ibid, pp. 188-190.  
faction rather than another with the aim of ensuring a large enough coalition to stay in power. 
According to this logic, concessions to the defeated “Islamic” factions were cheap because 
these groups had just been defeated and were likely to be grateful for any payoffs or even 
with just being allowed to survive and were certainly not able to immediately threaten 
Mujib’s power. On the other hand, concessions to factions which identified with “left-wing” 
symbols were potentially more expensive since these groups enjoyed greater legitimacy and 
could demand much bigger payoffs.  
 
This helps us to make sense of the apparent paradox of the “secular and progressive” 
Awami League offering a general pardon to Jamaat supporters under the order of 
November 30, 1973 but excluding from this pardon the thousands of supporters of “left-
wing” parties who were also in prison at that time. Instead of trying to accommodate the left, 
the Awami League literally went to war with them, killing tens of thousands of Maoists as 
well as supporters of the “left-wing” Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dol (JSD) which split from the 
Awami League in 1972. The Awami League’s strategy is also exemplified by the Daud 
Haidar case of 1974. Daud Haidar was a poet who wrote a so-called blasphemous poem 
and was hounded out of the country with the tacit approval of the Awami League who 
identified him as an atheist communist. Bhuiyan Monowar Kabir has provided a local-level 
account of the Pabna Awami League organization leading the hysteria against Daud Haidar 
in alliance with the recently pardoned Jamaat supporters in a bid to isolate the local JSD and 
Communist factions8. The Pabna alliance between the Awami League and the Jamaat 
proved to be a long-lasting one. In 1987 when a violent conflict broke out between the 
Jamaat and a left wing student alliance (Chhatro Moitri), a Jamaat office was burned down. 
The Awami League denounced the “burners of the Koran” and joint meetings were staged 
against the “atheists”9. 
 
Despite its flexibility and its willingness to dilute secularism in practice, the Awami League’s 
search for a “national identity” which would stabilize its hold on power did not succeed. The 
Awami League itself began to fragment. A large group left the party under the banner of 
socialism in 1972, though the claim of the JSD to represent a different class is also suspect if 
we examine their subsequent actions. Many of their leaders eventually found their way back 
into power by supporting the military government of General Ershad in the eighties. The 
breakdown of a united political vision and the failure of Mujib's attempts to hold the facade 
together by instituting a one-party state in 1975 was the prelude to his assassination and a 
long spell of military and quasi-military rule.  
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Mujib's assassination in 1975 was followed by two decades of a string of governments 
which tried to construct a new political unity by stressing the Islamic heritage of the nation. In 
1977, two years after Mujib’s assassination the constitution was amended to remove 
secularism as a fundamental principle. In 1988 the constitution was further amended to 
recognize Islam as the state religion. Nevertheless, once again we will be closer to the truth if 
we interpret these shifts as attempts by the new regimes to distinguish themselves from their 
old foes in the Awami League while adopting a unifying ideology which minimized the 
opportunities for opponents to mobilize large numbers of people. As before, old politicians 
and parties very frequently made the apparently undignified jump across the trenches 
depending on their personal assessments of the rewards being offered and the likelihood of 
making it back to power if they stuck to the old party. The military governments and their 
civilian successors absorbed many defectors from the Awami League who saw no 
contradiction in the new less secular identity of the ruling group. They also attracted old 
Maoists like Kazi Zafar and JSD socialists like Abdur Rab who argued that the 
developmental agenda of the military was more in tune with socialism. The secular agenda, 
to the extent that it was ever implemented, was correspondingly attenuated. Yet the stability 
even of this new equilibrium was short-lived. 
 
During this period, the “progressive” socialist parties were often found in alliance with the 
military while ranged against them were often an alliance of “progressive” secular parties and 
the “reactionary” Islamic parties. A local-level study done by Shapan Adnan in a Pabna 
constituency during the 1986 elections under President Ershad shows these alliances and 
calculations in operation. In the Pabna constituency he was looking at, the conflict was a 3-
way one between a JSD candidate, a Jamaat candidate and an Awami League candidate. 
Although Ershad was in power at the centre, his local candidate had no hope of winning.  
 
The polling happened in 60 centres but there was violence in three of the centres and votes 
had to be recast in these centres. After the votes in the first 57 centres had been counted the 
Jamaat candidate was leading. The overall turnout was 57%. If the turnout was similar in the 
other 3 centres the Jamaat candidate would win. As it turned out, the turnout in these 3 
centres turned out to be 93.2% out of which 76% voted for the JSD candidate who won a 
surprise victory. Adnan argues that the most plausible interpretation of the delayed counting 
and the violence is that the military administration had rigged the last three centres to help the 
“left” candidate win against the “Islamic” candidate who was in theory closer to their class 
and national identity positions10. Alternatively, the payoff required to placate a mere 
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manuscript, pp. 347-453. 
“socialist” was likely to be far less than the payoff required either for the Awami League or 
the Jamaat. Indeed the 7 JSD votes in parliament were later critical for Ershad. Thus we 
have the apparent paradox of a “right wing” general doing deals with socialists just as we 
have seen the secular Awami League frequently allying itself with Islamic parties to isolate 
the “left”. In each case, the examples show how irrespective of professed ideologies, a ruling 
party may prefer to ally with forces which were weak nationally and therefore had limited 
bargaining power but which could nevertheless deliver valuable local support. 
 
By the end of the eighties the ideological divisions had become much more confused with 
alliances between strange bedfellows becoming more and more common. Often tactical 
arguments were offered justifying apparently unprincipled alliances but more often no 
attempt at justification was thought necessary. As before none of this seemed to have any 
effect on the fundamental organization of society except incidentally in terms of increasing 
political instability, strikes and general disruptions. Thus in the late eighties, the BNP which 
had played a major part in reversing the moves towards constitutional secularism and the 
officially secular Awami League formed an alliance to fight the ruling Jatiya Party of Ershad 
which was ideologically indistinguishable from the BNP. Ershad’s long hold on power had 
essentially deeply agitated the two main opposition parties who sunk their apparently 
unbridgeable ideological differences in their fight to remove the dictator.  
 
An even more astounding alliance occurred in the early nineties between the Awami League 
and the Jamaat, the avowedly Islamic party seeking the creation of an Islamic state. In this 
instance, both parties formed an informal alliance against the then-ruling BNP government. It 
was around this time that the Awami League’s secular claims became muted, Sheikh Hasina 
the leader of the party began to wear a head scarf and  carry prayer beads. She even went 
on a pilgrimage to Mecca. None of this is necessarily anti-secular in the constitutional sense, 
but since symbolism is important in the politics of a country where the majority is still 
illiterate, Sheikh Hasina’s message to the people and to her opponents should not be 
misread as purely personal devotion. At this stage Sheikh Hasina certainly had a much more 
demonstrative Islamic persona than her arch opponent, the then prime minister Khaleda Zia 
who led a party committed to a Bengali Muslim national identity. Khaleda Zia was 
nevertheless a modern Muslim woman who did not wear a head scarf but only covered her 
head as many Bengali Muslim women do on ceremonial or religious occasions.  
 
Given what little actually separates them, new ways had to be devised to express the 
uniqueness of the major parties. The ideological markers distinguishing the Awami League 
from the BNP and other parties eventually turned on a distinction being established between 
Bangladeshi and Bengali nationalism. Bengali nationalism is supposed to be the nationalism 
of the Bengali-speaking people and Bangladeshi nationalism the nationalism of the 
Bangladeshi people. Since more than a third of Bengalis live in West Bengal in India and 
since Bangladesh includes tiny but politically important minorities like the Chakma, it may 
seem that someone who professed Bengali nationalism as opposed to Bangladeshi 
nationalism was actually supporting a very different programme of state construction in the 
long run. On the other hand since Bangladesh is a territorial unit which primarily contains the 
Muslim population of Bengal, secular groups could argue that support for a specifically 
Bangladeshi nationalism amounts to a de facto acceptance of Jinnah’s two nation theory and 
the Lahore resolution of 194011. Supporters of the Bangladeshi nationalism school do not 
disagree and believe that this does distinguish them from the secular group.  
 
On the face of it, therefore, the distinction appears to be a significant one. But is there a 
substantial disagreement on anything of substance which is likely to have any real impact on 
the operation of the Bangladeshi state? Since a substantial number of Bengalis live in the 
Indian state of West Bengal, one might have thought that supporters of Bengali nationalism 
would at least profess as a distant aim something amounting to re-unification or even closer 
political alliance or cooperation over time. After all this is what Korean nationalism means to 
the majority of Koreans who support it and what German nationalism meant to the 
supporters of the latter. But in fact, the Awami League does not define its Bengali 
nationalism in terms of any goal of forming an actual nation-state with the West Bengalis nor 
does it even propose closer governmental links or power sharing along the pattern being 
established in Ireland. In practice therefore it does not reject nor seek to alter the fact that 
Islam was the factor which historically justified the creation of a separate state which is now 
called Bangladesh and which is distinct from West Bengal. But this is exactly what 
Bangladeshi nationalism means for the BNP.  
 
The paradox is that in the context of clientelist politics there is no advantage to any faction 
leader or their clients on either side of the border in supporting a political merger where they 
are likely to become smaller fish in a bigger pond. The significance of the differences in their  
professed ideological positions, if any, has to be sought in the identity of the individuals who 
subscribe to one or other nationalism. This is indeed the function of this ideological divide, to 
distinguish competing groups from one another. Thus the new ideological divide is another 
example of the way in which the substance of ideological divisions is far less important than 
the necessity of making distinctions between competing groups. The fact that the substance 
of these ideological divisions may be incomprehensible to observers is actually irrelevant. 
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The political economy generating these divisions is much more comprehensible and it is to 
this that we now turn. 
 
3. Ideology, Religion and Clientelist Surplus Appropriation 
Religion clearly existed in developing countries long before the mass mobilizations organized 
by competing political factions which is the subject of our enquiry. While the conscious 
motivation behind the beliefs of the masses may be spiritual, there may also be strong 
material factors which bolster and sustain religious beliefs. Our purpose is not to explore the 
possible economic factors behind the deep roots of religions in the Indian subcontinent but 
rather to explore the use which middle-class-led factions have made of such primordial 
beliefs and identities. The hold of religion may be particularly strong in poor countries 
because poverty generates great uncertainties about the physical and political environment 
which in turn may make religion both valuable and necessary for many people to go about 
their daily lives. In the absence of a tradition of civil regulation, religion also structures many 
interpersonal relationships within families and between generations though the importance of 
such relationships clearly varies between classes. Finally religion may be important in 
sustaining social stability and economic interaction at a decentralized level by providing 
human networks with shared beliefs and rituals.  
 
Thus “economic” motivations may have been at least partly behind the spread and tenacity 
of religious beliefs in the first place even though the types of religious beliefs have varied 
widely over time and place even for the same religion. But more importantly, once in place, 
the existence of shared beliefs and sources of identity may provide new opportunities for 
economic mobility for those who prove to be successful political entrepreneurs. Electoral 
politics requires the mobilization of large numbers of people and the existence of group 
loyalties based on religion, language or caste significantly simplifies the task of mobilization 
faced by political entrepreneurs. 
 
The characteristic feature of clientelist surplus appropriation is that competing patron-client 
networks compete for shares of the social surplus by attempting to gain control of the state 
apparatus. Analytically, this representation stresses the significance of faction building 
followed by factional conflicts based on their relative organizational power. This approach to 
modelling subcontinental political economy may be contrasted with Bardhan’s model for 
India which stresses the competition between a number of conventional classes, namely the 
industrial capitalists, professionals and landlords12. In contrast, in the case of clientelist 
surplus appropriation the competition takes place between competing multi-class factions 
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each of which is composed of more elementary patron-client groups organized in a 
pyramidal fashion. Each faction may include members of many different classes but they are 
typically organized and led by members of the educated middle and lower middle classes. 
 
The ability of any particular primary faction to get included in a party or coalition depends on 
its perceived ability to deliver organizational power at least cost. Organizational power is 
defined as the ability of the primary faction to impose costs on its opponents through its 
power to disrupt. The coalition as a whole wants to have the maximum number of such 
factions within it but not without limit because the more factions that are incorporated, the 
more thinly will the available spoils of office have to be distributed. The success of the 
coalition or party in turn depends on the organizational power it can field and its holding 
power in continuing the process of opposition till it is accommodated. For this pattern of 
accumulation to explain what we see in terms of the ideological and political instability we 
need to address several further questions. 
 
The first question we have to answer is why individuals at the bottom of the social pyramid 
identify with particular elite factions. It may appear that supporting a faction at best offers the 
poor a redistributive payoff at the whim of their leaders if and when the latter succeed in 
getting access to state power while straightforward collective action based on class politics 
may seem to give a more assured set of benefits.  
 
One answer could be that poor people in developing countries such as Bangladesh are 
irrational in the modern sense and are swayed by emotive symbols which they are 
insufficiently modern or educated to see through. This is not a satisfactory explanation. The 
electorate in more advanced countries also respond to symbols and prejudices and yet seem 
to learn much faster that some policies work better than others when it comes to their 
fundamental material interests. A more plausible explanation may be that individuals at the 
bottom of the pyramid in countries like Bangladesh behave in the observed way because 
what little they can potentially get through the success of their faction is greater than the 
expected payoffs from class action.  
 
For instance it may be that the poor believe on the basis of past experience that inclusive 
collective action would be extremely difficult to organize. This is because the poor rightly 
perceive that they are fragmented, that the class policy relevant for them would alienate both 
the very rich and the not so rich, and that the latter would use many different strategies to 
divide them. We know from psychological and economic theories of cognitive dissonance 
that rational individuals often do not want to aim to achieve things which cannot be achieved 
as this causes psychological distress. Beliefs about what is desirable or preferred such as 
non-class based redistributive strategies may then be constructed to rationalize the strategies 
which are perceived to be possible. In other words, the poor may be participating in patron-
client redistributive strategies not because they hold on to particular ideologies, rather the 
types of ideologies we observe may be there because they work in mobilizing feasible 
redistributive factions.  
 
A more fundamental problem may be that the poor (and indeed their intellectual leaders) 
may not be able to visualize a credible change in the productive system which could make 
everyone who was poor better off. In that case, upward mobility and surplus appropriation 
would truly be a zero-sum game for some of the poor. If only some of the poor are likely to 
benefit from redistributive strategies given the perceived size of the pie to be redistributed, 
there may be a “inverse-U-shaped” relationship between the size of the group you belong to 
and the payoff you get. If the group is too small, its bargaining power is negligible and the 
payoff it gets is zero. If it is too big, involving for instance all the poor, the payoff is again 
very small because the payoff has to be widely distributed. The typical patron-client faction 
may offer the best payoff to the individual poor person, providing that he or she succeeds in 
selecting the right one. Belonging to a faction and participating in this gamble may be 
attractive given the very limited opportunity cost as perceived by the poor themselves. 
 
In one sense, this situation reflects the underdevelopment of a capitalist industrial economy. 
The absence of a sufficient social surplus which can credibly be redistributed or re-deployed 
to benefit the poor as a whole makes redistribution by necessity an intensely contested game 
where the groups demanding redistribution or reallocation of public resources are in intense 
competition with each other. 
 
The question from the point of view of the middle class/petty-bourgeois organisers of 
factions is why they choose a strategy of populist mobilization based on a degree of 
redistribution to their mass supporters instead of independent class politics of their own. 
Once again, if upwardly mobile middle class political entrepreneurs could envisage better 
strategies of accumulating surplus through class organizations of their own, the clientelist 
strategy would be hard to explain without recourse to irrational behaviour or ignorance. In 
fact, there are good reasons to believe that their possibilities of accumulation through 
alternative strategies may be rather limited. Unlike the middle class based in the professions 
in the advanced capitalist countries, the intermediate classes in developing countries do not 
by and large have productive positions which they seek to defend or expand. Their 
resources often come in the main from redistributions through the state, a tradition which 
goes back to the roots of this class as an administrative creation of the colonial state to 
administer colonies and maintain political stability.  
Finally we need to ask why this process does not result in an institutional solution which 
entails less conflict and risk for the organizers, say through the creation of a big enough 
coalition which incorporates all the major factions. This might in principle allow 
redistributions which could satisfy everybody and there is at least the possibility that the 
political peace which may follow would allow some semblance of development to occur. 
The answer to this is a contingent one, rather than one which follows from the accumulation 
process itself. It is simply that economies like Bangladesh or indeed India and Pakistan are 
too poor to satisfactorily accommodate their emerging intermediate classes as a whole, 
while factions led by the intermediate classes are too powerful to have any solution imposed 
on them which they think reduces the payoffs which they perceive they may have got 
through competitive struggle13. 
 
Occasional attempts have in fact been made in the past in Bangladesh to stop the internecine 
conflicts by processes of either forced inclusion or forced exclusion of factions. Both 
strategies have failed. An example of the former was the creation of BAKSAL, the 
Bangladesh Workers’ and Peasants’ Awami League by Mujib in 1974 as a last desperate 
attempt to keep his coalition together. This was the only party which would be allowed in his 
proposed one-party state and everyone in any organizational position had to belong. It was 
a simple calculation for the competing factions that this solution would permanently reduce 
the payoff for each to a very small amount even though it would guarantee this payoff 
forever. The forced inclusion may have worked for a brief time if the middle class 
organizations which were being forced to participate were relatively underdeveloped 
organizationally and if the party in power was a true revolutionary party which monopolized 
violence. Neither was true for the Awami League and the attempt simply made groups 
within the Awami League conspire in his assassination and many welcomed the army as 
saviours of the nation. 
 
The army in turn has repeatedly used strategies of exclusion to manage the system by 
imposing martial law and banning political activity. These strategies too work very 
temporarily in Bangladesh and once again the answer has to be sought in the power of 
excluded groups to force their selective inclusion through the imposition of huge costs on the 
regime through programmes of civil disobedience and protest.  
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This brings us to a brief evaluation of the economic consequences of the process of 
clientelist surplus appropriation. The answer should be obvious by now, the consequences 
are severe and negative. This is partly due to the loss of investible surplus from potentially 
productive uses and even more so to the losses caused by perennial political instability and 
economic cycles. Economic cycles are generated as the party in power is forced to 
accommodate a growing number of factions over time. This in turn leads to unhappiness on 
the part of some incumbent factions who see their payoffs shrinking as a result of greater 
accommodation. Some of them may eventually begin to leave to join the opposition, or the 
opposition on its own will eventually collect together enough discontent to bring down the 
ruling coalition. The regime eventually collapses, either through the democratic process or 
through military takeovers and cycle is repeated for new incumbents. 
 
The political economy of clientelist surplus appropriation may offer a more convincing 
explanation of the volatile political conflicts in Bangladesh and elsewhere in the Indian 
subcontinent. The rapidly changing ideological positions of the dominant groups in 
Bangladesh can be related to these clientelist processes of accumulation and 
accommodation in the Bangladesh economy. The ideologies serve as focal points at each 
stage in the contest for included and excluded groups. While the range of ideological and 
religious symbols are defined by the values and symbols inherited from the past, what is 
interesting for us is the way in which each group chooses the precise mix of symbols and 
values in line with the changes in the array of insiders and outsiders.  
 
This does not necessarily allow us to predict the precise ideologies which will be emerging 
over time but it does allow us to predict that the existing ones will not survive. More than 
that, it allows us to say that the content of the ideology does not matter in a substantive way 
for the economic interests of the competing groups. The victory or defeat of a faction 
determines who is getting a share of the social surplus, not how the social surplus is being 
generated.  
 
While our examples have been drawn from Bangladesh, a similar fracturing of political 
identities is happening on a bigger scale though more slowly in India and Pakistan. What is 
interesting about the Bangladesh experience is that it shows how political fracturing can 
happen even in relatively homogenous regions of the Indian subcontinent where the bulk of 
the politically active population is not divided by language, religion or caste. This forces us to 
ask if there are economic imperatives which may be persuading competing factions to look 
for new identities in ways which prevent the resolution of conflicts. While such an 
explanation does not detract from the importance of a substantive analysis of culture and 
ideology, it suggests that the roots of the political instability facing the Indian subcontinent 
may lie in the accumulation strategies of upwardly mobile classes who use a variety of 
ideological symbols to differentiate themselves from competing groups.  
 
If the economic motivations behind the fragmentation of identity formation are a substantial 
part of the true picture, this clearly has consequences for political attempts to enforce new 
national identities in the countries of the Indian subcontinent and in similar political-economic 
contexts elsewhere. If the underlying determinants of these accumulation strategies are not 
addressed, political stability may not be achievable even in relatively homogenous countries 
like Bangladesh. The argument may be even more relevant for India and Pakistan to the 
extent that they share a political economy similar to that of Bangladesh. In the long run these 
processes may prove to be even more important in the other two major countries of the 
Indian subcontinent simply because their national, religious and caste diversity provides 
many more potential fissures for group formation than are available in modern Bangladesh.  
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the tussle between secularism and religion and the contradictory 
stances adopted by the participants in the context of Bangladesh needs to be evaluated in 
the context of a specific political economy which we have described as clientelist surplus 
appropriation. Our analysis implies that any simplistic association of secular forces with 
social and economic progress is misguided. Such an association is based on inappropriate 
parallels being drawn with the Western European historical experience which we have 
briefly described. The historical evidence in Bangladesh (supported by that from India) has 
been that the economic processes which are supported by competing factions of different 
ideological hues are not essentially different. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we 
should be neutral between explicitly communal policies and those which are secular. We 
should not be neutral but our opposition has to be based on the political side-effects of some 
types of religious mobilizations, and indeed some types of linguistic or caste mobilizations. 
The more fundamental point is that all these types of clientelist mobilizations are in a broader 
sense regressive, including the apparently progressive secular ones. The political economy of 
the Awami League in Bangladesh suggests this only too clearly. It is difficult to argue that it 
will promote a faster and more sustained economic and social transition given what we 
know about its own history and the clientelist processes on which its power is based. The 
construction of viable alternatives to the productive process which can convince the poor 
majority of these countries that they will do better by supporting class politics rather than 
factional politics is the most important challenge facing progressives in the Indian 
subcontinent. 
